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All usThis paper considers equilibrium two-sided search with ex ante hetero-
geneous agents, vectors of attributes, and idiosyncratic match draws.
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able utility case to the collective household model with bargaining,
for which transferable utility is a special case. The approach is powerful
for it identifies a simple algorithm that, in our numerical application, is
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Allaggregation problem is severe: ex ante heterogeneous singles use differ-
entmatch strategies and equilibrium requires that each individual’s strat-
egy must be a best response to the aggregated match strategies of the op-
posite sex.We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium and an
existence proof when agents have vectors of attributes. Although the pa-
per focuses on the nontransferable utility case (in the sense of Burdett
and Coles [1997]), the arguments apply equally to the collective house-
hold case (e.g., Browning and Chiappori 1998) for which transferable
utility is a special case and also allows idiosyncratic match draws as first
considered in Burdett and Wright (1998). The approach is powerful for it
identifies a simple algorithm that, in the numerical application, is found
to rapidly converge to equilibrium. We use the framework to consider the
impact of equal labor market opportunities for women on female educa-
tion choice, labor market participation rates, partner choice, and welfare.
Following seminal work by Becker (1973, 1974), it is well known that
partnerships between men and women are positively sorted along many
dimensions such as age, income, education, ethnic origin, health, height,
and psychometric scores (e.g., Fisman et al. 2006; Hitsch, Hortaçsu, and
Ariely 2010; Belot and Francesconi 2013).With frictionlessmatching, the
existence of stable-match allocations with multiple attributes has long
been established (see Browning, Chiappori, andWeiss [2014] for a useful
survey). Given a restriction to finite types and transferable utility, Choo
and Siow (2006) show how observedmarriage patterns can be used to ex-
actly identify the gains to marriage, while Galichon and Salanié (2010)
and Dupuy and Galichon (2014) extend that approach to allow a contin-
uum of types.1 Here instead we consider equilibrium matching with fric-
tions in which, even with modern-day internet dating sites, it takes time
for singles to findmutually desired life partners. An important difference
is that when rejecting a potential match, the agent’s outside option here
is to continue to search for a preferred partner (rather thanmatch imme-
diately with someone else or remain permanently unmatched). The re-
sulting framework simultaneously addresses sorting issues (who marries
whom) along with the timing of marriage (who marries when).
There is a large literature on equilibrium search with ex ante het-
erogeneous agents.2 By extending that framework to multiple female at-1 See also Galichon, Kominers, and Weber (2019) for a more general analysis. Chiap-
pori, Oreffice, and Quintana-Domeque (2012) construct a model with multiple character-
istics, which, however, reduces to matching along a one-dimensional index.
2 Themarriage approach typically assumesnontransferableutility. See, e.g., Lu andMcAfee
(1996), Burdett and Coles (1997, 1999), Eeckhout (1999), Bloch and Ryder (2000), Chade
(2001), Chade and Ventura (2002), Smith (2006), Gautier, Svarer, and Teulings (2010), Coles
and Francesconi (2011), and Díaz-Giménez and Giolito (2013). The labor market context in-
stead assumes that utility is transferable with Nash bargaining over the wage paid; see, e.g.,
Shimer and Smith (2000). Recent work with multiple attributes includes Goussé, Jacquemet,
and Robin (2017) and Lindenlaub and Postel-Vinay (2017).
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equilibrium search with multiple attributes 000tributes, we analyze how the arrival of equal opportunities radically trans-
formed female match incentives in the marriage market. Our focus is
motivated by figures 1 and 2, which describe the large change in female
economic outcomes in the United States following the 1950s. Figure 1
shows the employment rates of womenaged 25–34. Single (never-married)
women in this age group have always had relatively high labor market
participation rates (around 80 percent since 1940). But for this same age
group, the labor market participation rates of women with children dra-
matically increased following the early 1950s. With household production
increasingly sustained by new labor-saving appliances, children safely at
school, and a doubling of real wages from themid-1930s to 1960, mothers
had an ever-increasing incentive to switchmore of their time to the boom-
ing labormarket (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke 2005;Green-
wood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu 2005). But prior to the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, “marriage bars” were commonly used in professions such as doctors,
lawyers, teachers, and clerks to restrict the employment prospects of mar-
ried women (see Kessler-Harris 1982, 2001; Goldin 1990, 1991). These mar-
riage bars had real bite: of those married women who were labor market
participants in 1920, only 10 percent were employed as teachers or clerical
workers. By 1970 that statistic had risen to 40 percent (Goldin 1991).FIG. 1.—Female employment rate, women aged 25–34. Sources: IPUMS census 1860–
2000, 2009 ACS sample. See the appendix for a description of the data and variables used.
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AllImproved labor market opportunities for women increase the female
return to college education. Rather than participating in the labor mar-
ket for just a few years while single and childless, young women might in-
stead anticipate a lifelong return to a professional qualification. Over the
period 1940–2009 and for the same age group 25–34, figure 2 reports the
fraction of these women with a college education and so captures the aver-
age education choice of women in the 15–24 age groupmade in the previous
decade. Assuming rational expectations, figure 1 then describes female ex-
pectations of future labor market participation rates when a mother. Begin-
ning in the 1950s, figures 1 and 2 demonstrate the decades-long, coincident
increases in the labor market participation rates of mothers and the college
attendance rates of (young) females.
There is a large literature detailing how female economic opportunities
improved following the 1950s. For example, Greenwood et al. (2016) ar-
gue that changes in home production technologies (the “engines of liber-
ation”) were the primary factor for increased female labor market partic-
ipation. Albanesi and Olivetti (2016) describe how the development of
infant formula and improved medication freed the nursing mother from
thehome.3 In contrast, using occupational choicedata,Hsieh et al. (2018)FIG. 2.—Fraction of female college graduates, women aged 25–34. See sources and note
to figure 1. Color version available as an online enhancement.3 A number of studies emphasize a positive impact of wartime work on women’s subse-
quent employment and economic condition. See, among others, Acemoglu, Autor, and
Lyle (2004), Goldin and Olivetti (2013), and Doepke, Hazan, and Maoz (2015).
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equilibrium search with multiple attributes 000argue that college discrimination was the major factor in distorting labor
market outcomes. The 1964 Civil Rights Act, which outlawed restrictive
employment practices against women, also played an important role. We
do not consider here the relative impact played by each of these factors
in improving the female economic condition.4 Rather, the focus of our ap-
plication is to understand how a major advancement in female labor mar-
ket opportunities affects marital incentives.
Because female education rates have changed so radically since the
1950s, the numerical application extends the matching framework to
allow ex ante investment by agents—that women may invest in a college
education (also see Greenwood et al. 2016; Goussé et al. 2017). Because
the return to female education choice depends on the (endogenous)
proposal strategies of men, however, the investment problem may not
be well behaved. Indeed Burdett and Coles (2001) analyze a search equi-
librium inwhich agents vary by a single attribute andfind that themarginal
return to investment is neither continuous, decreasing, nor bounded. Nor
need it be the case, say, that higher-ability women have a greater return to
education. To obtain results, the application restricts attention to a binary
education choice andmust check numerically that private investments are
optimal.
The numerical application supposes that women have two attributes,
“ability” and “charm,” where ability describes earnings capabilities in the
labor market while charm is assumed a nonproductive asset in the labor
market but is valuable in the marriage market.5 The key presumption is
that the arrival of equal opportunities for women much increased the
(labormarket) return to female ability. Because charm and ability provide
very different matching incentives for single women, the arrival of equal
opportunities for women fundamentally changed femalematch outcomes,
marital sorting, and the timing of life partnerships. For example, we find
that a “family tax,” as implied by standard OECD equivalence scales, ex-
plains why high-ability (highly paid, college-educated) women are rela-
tively slow tomatch. In contrast,more charmingwomen tend tomatch rel-
atively quickly, for charm in the model does not pay the bills while single
and the charming single woman can monetize the value of her charms
only by matching with a desirable life partner.4 The change in public policies and attitudes to the employment of married women with
children had a tremendous impact on female behavior, occupations, and earnings (Beller
1982; Harrison 1988; Rosen 2000). Fernandez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) find evidence
that attitudes of men brought up in families in which the mother worked played a signif-
icant role in the increase in female labor force participation over time. See also Costa
(2000) and Goldin (2006).
5 Of course male preferences over female partners may depend on many attributes, e.g.,
(potential) inheritance (Stone 1977), physical beauty (Cole,Mailath, and Postlewaite 1992),
pizzazz (Burdett and Coles 1997), nurturing skills (Goldin and Katz 2002), or simply home
productivity.
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AllThe next section describes the equilibrium marriage model of two-
sided search with vectors of attributes, idiosyncratic match draws, and
general payoff functions for two cases: (i) nontransferable utility and
(ii) the collective household model. Section III describes the application
of the model to the arrival of equal opportunities for women, extended
to allow endogenous investment. Section IV presents conclusions.II. The ModelWe establish the key arguments assuming nontransferable utility (in the
search sense; see Burdett and Coles 1997). The second part then extends
to the collective households case (Chiappori 1992).A. Nontransferable UtilityWe consider a continuous-time, infinite horizon family formation model
with frictions and nontransferable utility (NTU). Only steady-state equi-
libria are considered. There are two sexes, male and female (indexed by
s5 m, f, respectively), and a continuum of agents of both sexes. All part-
nerships involve one man and one woman, and there is an equal mea-
sure of unpartnered men and women in the singles market. Search is
random, and l > 0 denotes the rate at which any single meets a potential
partner of the opposite sex. For simplicity all agents are infinitely lived
and discount the future at rate r > 0, and partnerships last forever (i.e.,
there is no divorce).
Each male is described by a vector of characteristics xm ∈ Qm and each
female by vector xf ∈ Qf . Should a male xm match with a female xf , the
male obtains payoff Umðxm, xfÞ 1 vm=r , while the female enjoys payoff
Uf ðxm , xf Þ 1 vf =r . The partners’ attribute-dependent payoffs Um() and
Uf() are assumed bounded for all ðxm , xfÞ ∈ ðQm  QfÞ. The vm, vf terms
describe idiosyncratic “love” draws, considered as independent random
draws from exogenous cumulative distribution function H(). We do
not rule out mass points in H and so can allow that H() is degenerate
(i.e., no love draws). What is essential is that the surplus function
Sð~vÞ 5 Ð ∞~v ½1 2 H ðvÞdv exists, which is a positive, continuous, decreasing
function with lim~v→∞Sð~vÞ 5 0. The flow payoff while single is umðxmÞ ≥ 0
for males and uf ðxf Þ ≥ 0 for females, which are also bounded functions
for all ðxm , xfÞ ∈ ðQm  QfÞ.
Let GmðxmÞ describe the distribution of male attributes xm across single
men and Gf ðxfÞ the distribution of female attributes xf . Random search
implies that should single male xm meet a single woman, her attributes xf
are considered a random draw from Gf(). Similarly from her perspec-
tive, his attributes xm are a random draw from Gm(). Given a contact,
each observes the other’s attributes and draws independent love valuesThis content downloaded from 129.081.226.078 on January 05, 2019 09:37:58 AM
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equilibrium search with multiple attributes 000(vm, v f ). A match is formed only if both agree to it; otherwise they sepa-
rate and continue to search.
If two singles agree to form a match, they permanently exit the singles
market and have two children, a son who inherits his father’s character-
istics xm and a daughter who inherits her mother’s characteristics xf . As
we consider only steady states, there is no further loss in generality by as-
suming each child instantaneously grows up and immediately enters the
singles market. Burdett and Coles (1999) refer to this as the “clones as-
sumption.”6 The clones assumption is convenient for it usefully abstracts
from intercohort competition for partners: the decision to form a match
and exit the pool of singles does not affect the match opportunities of
the remaining singles.7 The approach is relevant for the birth cohort dis-
tribution is then endogenously determined. For example, types who
never marry, and so do not have children, are absent from the birth co-
hort. Conversely, those who match quickly are overrepresented in the
birth cohort (and in the general population).
Strategies and values.—Let V mðxmÞ denote the expected discounted life-
time payoff of a single male with attributes xm using an optimal match
strategy. Let V f ðxf Þ denote the corresponding value of a single female
with characteristics xf . With NTUand given contact with female xf , a male
xm will propose a partnership if and only if his match payoff Umðxm , xf Þ1
vm=r exceeds the value of remaining single, V mðxmÞ. His optimal proposal
strategy thus has the reservation love property: the single male will pro-
pose if and only if vm ≥ ~vm , where
~vm 5 r V m xmð Þ 2 Um xm , xf
  
,
and ~vm 5 ~vmðxf jxmÞ is type specific. We define the male proposal propen-
sity as
Pmðxf jxmÞ 5 1 2 H ð~vmÞ, (1)
which, given a contact, is the probability that male xm will propose to fe-
male xf .
By symmetry, given contact with male xm , single female xf has reserva-
tion love value ~v f ðxmjxf Þ given by
~v f 5 r V f xf
 
2 Uf xf , xm
  
,
and the female proposal propensity is6 An alternative is to assume that each child’s attribute is a mix of his or her parents’
characteristics plus a random element. Similarly, one might wish to endogenize the fertility
choice. Both extensions are potentially important research projects but go beyond the
scope of the current paper.
7 This assumption parallels that of the frictionless approach in which the set of un-
matched agents is exogenous.
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AllP f ðxmjxfÞ 5 1 2 H ð~vf Þ: (2)
Given proposal propensities (1) and (2), we now determine values
V mðxmÞ and V f ðxf Þ.
Recall that a single male xm ∈ Qm meets a potential female partner at
rate l whose traits xf are considered a random draw from Gf(). Standard
arguments imply V mðxmÞ is identified by the Bellman equation:
rV m xmð Þ 5 um xmð Þ 1 l
ð
xf ∈Qf
Pm xm , xf
 
P f ðxmjxf ÞdGf xf
 
,
where
Pm xm , xf
 
5
ð∞
2∞
max Um xm , xf
 
1 vm=r 2 V m xmð Þ, 0
 
dH vmð Þ: (3)
In words, random matching implies that lP f ðxm jxf ÞdGf ðxf Þ is the rate at
which male xm contacts a single female of type xf ∈ Qf who is willing to
match with him. Given such a contact, he then enjoys expected surplus
Pmðxm, xf Þ depending on whether his realized match payoff UmðÞ 1 vm=r
exceeds Vm(). Integrating (3) by parts implies Pmðxm , xf Þ 5 Sð~vmÞ=r ,
where ~vm is his reservation love value and S() is the surplus function.
Hence V mðxmÞ is the solution to the implicit function
rV m 5 um xmð Þ 1 l
r
ð
xf ∈Qf
S r V m 2 Um xm , xf
   
 P f ðxm jxf ÞdGf xf
 
:
(4)
Given xm and female proposal strategies P f ðÞ ∈ ½0, 1, (4) determines
V m 5 V mðxmÞ. The properties of the surplus function S() imply that
the right-hand side of (4) is a positive, continuous, decreasing function
of Vm that limits to umðxmÞ as V m→∞. It follows that V mðxmÞ exists, is
unique, and implies V mðxmÞ ≥ umðxmÞ=r . Note this argument does not im-
ply V mðxmÞ is continuous for P f() need not be continuous in xm ; see, for
example, the equilibrium class structure in Burdett and Coles (1997).
Fortunately, continuity is not necessary for the existence proof.
By symmetry, V f 5 V f ðxf Þ is given by
rV f 5 uf xf
 
1
l
r
ð
xm∈Qm
S r V f 2 Uf xf , xm
   
 Pmðxf jxmÞdGm xmð Þ:
(5)
Equations (4) and (5) thus uniquely determine V mðxmÞ and V f ðxf Þ for all
ðxm , xf Þ ∈ ðQm  Qf Þ given the proposal propensities of the opposite sex.
Of course equilibrium will require the proposal propensities to be con-
sistent with these values.This content downloaded from 129.081.226.078 on January 05, 2019 09:37:58 AM
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equilibrium search with multiple attributes 000Before defining and establishing the existence of equilibrium, it is use-
ful first to detail how changes in proposal strategies affect agent values.
Specifically, consider a woman xf and two different proposal strategies by
men, Pm1 ðÞ and Pm0 ðÞ. Let V f1 ðxf Þ and V f0 ðxf Þ denote the solutions to (5)
with Pm equal to Pm1 and P
m
0 , respectively.
Lemma 1. If Pm1 ðxf jxmÞ ≥ Pm0 ðxf jxmÞ for all xm ∈ Qm , then V f1 ðxfÞ ≥
V
f
0 ðxf Þ.
Lemma 1 simply says that a woman xf is better off when all men are
more likely to propose to her. The result follows immediately from (5):
for any given V f and noting that the surplus function is positive, the
right-hand side of this equation is increasing in Pm. Thus V f solving (5)
must increase with an increase in Pm.
We can now identify an upper bound on values. Lemma 1 implies that
the ideal situation for each male xm is that all women propose with prob-
ability one; that is, P f 5 1 for all xf ∈ Qf :Now consider his ideal match x*f
defined as
x*f xmð Þ 5 arg max
xf ∈Qf
Um xm, xf
 
:
It follows that V mðxmÞ ≤ V mðxmÞ, where
r V m 5 um xmð Þ 1 l
r
S r V m 2 Um xm, x*f
   
, (6)
for V m describes the value of being single in a market where all women
propose and every woman is also his ideal match. The assumptions on
S() guarantee that V m defined by (6) exists and V m ≥ umðxmÞ=r . We have
thus established the following result.
Lemma 2. For any male xm ∈ Qm and female proposal strategies
P f ðÞ ∈ ½0, 1, the solution for V mðxmÞ exists, is unique, and is bounded
with
V m xmð Þ ∈ um xmð Þ
r
, V m xmð Þ
 
:
Armed with lemmas 1 and 2, we are now in a position to define and
establish the existence of an equilibrium. The definition of a matching
equilibrium simply requires agent values Vm, V f and proposal propensities
Pm, P f to be consistent.
Definition (Matching equilibrium [NTU]). Equilibrium is the set
of functions {P m, P f, Vm, V f } over ðxm, xf Þ ∈ ðQm  Qf Þ that satisfy the func-
tional equations (1)–(2) and (4)–(5).
Existence is established by considering the following fixed-point prob-
lem. Let V mk ðxmÞ 5 V mðxmÞ for all xm ∈ Qm describe the equilibrium male
values in which equilibrium implies V mk ðxmÞ ≥ umðxmÞ=r . Equation (1) then
implies male proposal propensitiesThis content downloaded from 129.081.226.078 on January 05, 2019 09:37:58 AM
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AllPmk ðxf jxmÞ 5 1 2 H r V mk xmð Þ 2 Um xm , xf
   
: (7)
Given male proposal propensities Pmk ðÞ ∈ ½0, 1, the Bellman equa-
tion (5) then uniquely yields V f ðxf Þ for each xf ∈ Qf . Let V fk ðÞ denote this
solution. Given V f 5 V fk ðÞ, equation (2) then yields female proposal pro-
pensities
Pk
f ð Þ 5 1 2 H r V fk xf
 
2 Uf xf , xm
   
: (8)
Of course given these female proposal propensities Pk
f ðÞ ∈ ½0, 1, (4)
then uniquely determines V mðxmÞ for all xm ∈ Qm (and implies V mðxmÞ ≥
umðxmÞ=r). Let V mk11ðÞ denote this updated solution. This identifies func-
tional equation V mk11 5 TV
m
k , where equilibrium corresponds to its fixed
point V m 5 TV m . The existence proof uses the following monotonicity
property.
Lemma 3 (Monotonicity). If V mk ðxmÞ ≥ V mk11ðxmÞ for all xm ∈ Qm, then
TV mk ðxmÞ ≥ TV mk11ðxmÞ for all xm ∈ Qm.
Proof. As H() is an increasing function, V mk ðxmÞ ≥ V mk11ðxmÞ for all
xm ∈ Qm and (7) implies Pmk ðÞ ≤ Pmk11ðÞ for all xm ∈ Qm , xf ∈ Qf . Lemma 1
establishes V fk ðÞ ≤ V fk11ðÞ for all xf ∈ Qf . AsH() is an increasing function,
V fk ðÞ ≤ V fk11ðÞ for all xf ∈ Qf and (8) implies Pkf ðÞ ≥ Pk11f ðÞ for all xf ∈ Qf ,
xm ∈ Qm . Lemma 1 establishes TV mk ðxmÞ ≥ TV mk11ðxmÞ for all xm ∈ Qm, and
so the mapT is monotonic. QED
The proof of lemma 3 reflects the following structure. When all sin-
gle men are better off, each man becomes more selective in the marriage
market: given a contact with a single woman, each man proposes with a
lower probability. Lemma 1 then implies that every single woman is worse
off for it is harder to find a man who is willing to form a permanent part-
nership. Now when all single women are worse off, each becomes less se-
lective in the marriage market and her proposal propensities increase.
Lemma 1 then implies that every single man is better off. These feedback
effects suggest that multiple equilibria may occur where men, say, prefer
an equilibrium in which women are less selective (and men more selec-
tive) while women prefer a different equilibrium in which men are less
selective (and women more selective). The proof of lemma 3, however,
shows that this feedback mechanism also implies monotonicity of the
mapTVm. Establishing existence of an equilibrium is now straightfor-
ward.
Theorem 1. A matching equilibrium exists.
Proof. Existence follows by repeated iteration of the map V mk11ðxmÞ 5
TV mk ðxmÞ, starting at the upper bound V m0 ðÞ 5 V mðÞ. As V m1 ðxmÞ 5
TV m0 ðxmÞ ≤ V mðxmÞ for all xm ∈ Qm , lemma 3 and an induction argument
imply a sequence of decreasing values V mk11ðxmÞ ≤ V mk ðxmÞ for each xm ∈
Qm , k 5 0, 1, 2, ::: . As this sequence is bounded below by umðxmÞ=r , a
limit point exists for every xm ∈ Qm. As this limiting set of values is theThis content downloaded from 129.081.226.078 on January 05, 2019 09:37:58 AM
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equilibrium search with multiple attributes 000required fixed point, an equilibrium must exist. This completes the
proof of the theorem. QED
The proof of theorem 1 identifies a simple algorithm by which we can
numerically compute matching equilibria. Indeed there are clear paral-
lels with the original algorithm by Gale and Shapley (1962). That algo-
rithm identifies stable match allocations by describing how womenmake
acceptance decisions given the current set of male proposals, and the al-
gorithm sequentially updates the set ofmale proposal choices given those
acceptance rules. Here instead with search frictions, matching equilibria
are identified by sequentially updating agent values, which then deter-
mine proposal strategies. An added parallel is that if there are two equi-
libria in which, say, all men prefer equilibrium 1 to equilibrium 2, then
monotonicity of the map T implies iteration starting with V m0 ðÞ 5 V m
(i.e., men extract full marital surplus in the first step) will converge to
equilibrium 1, while iteration starting with V m0 ðÞ 5 umðÞ=r (i.e., women
extract full marital surplus in the first step) will converge to equilib-
rium 2.
In the next section we describe a particular application of this frame-
work. Before doing that, however, we show how to extend the argument
to the collective household case.B. Matching Equilibrium with Collective HouseholdsConsider instead a household (xm , xf , v) with v 5 ðvm , v f Þ ∈ Θ, which
takes collective actions z ∈ Zðxm , xf , vÞ. Because frictions imply that mar-
ital surplus may be strictly positive, an equilibrium framework must de-
scribe how that surplus is shared. We adopt the standard Nash bargain-
ing approach: partners (xm, xf , v) choose actions z to solve
max
z∈Z
U 1ðzjxm, xf , vÞ 2 V m
 a
U 2ðzjxm , xf , vÞ 2 V f
 12a
, (9)
where U 1 and U 2 are the respective male and female payoffs within the
match. Threat points (Vm, V f) are the agents’ respective values of remain-
ing single, where a 5 1 implies that themale appropriates all of thematch
surplus while a 5 0 implies that the female appropriates all the match sur-
plus. Thus a ∈ ½0, 1 parameterizes the male share of any match surplus.
As is well known, an equivalent representation is to define the “utility
production possibility frontier”; that is, given any household (xm, xf , v),
define Pareto frontier U m 5 UðU f jxm , xf , vÞ, where
U m 5 max
z∈Z
U 1ðzjxm , xf , vÞ subject to U 2ðzjxm , xf , vÞ ≥ U f:
Thus UðÞ describes the male’s maximized marital payoff Um should his
partner obtain U f. If the Pareto frontier Uðjxm , xf , vÞ is not concave
(e.g., there may be indivisibilities in the action set Z ), lotteries are thenThis content downloaded from 129.081.226.078 on January 05, 2019 09:37:58 AM
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Alloptimal (e.g., partners take turns taking out the trash), in which case we
consider the convex hull of Uðjxm , xf , vÞ, which is concave.8 Thus when-
ever a gain to trade exists, marital payoffs ( ~U m, ~U f ) solve
ð~U m , ~U f Þ 5 arg max
ðU m ,U f Þ
½U m 2 V ma½U f 2 V f 12a
subject to U m 5 U U f jxm , xf , v
 
:
(10)
As in the previous case, women always have the option to remain sin-
gle, and so their value of being single Vf ðxf Þ is no lower than uf ðxf Þ=r .
Thus in any household in which a gain to trade exists, Uðuf ðxf Þ=r jxm ,
xf , vÞ describes the maximal male payoff. We ensure that male values ex-
ist by assuming
E vU
uf xf
 
r

	 

  exists for all  xm , xf
 
∈ ðQm  Qf Þ: (11)
Because men must have VmðxmÞ ≥ umðxmÞ=r , (11) ensures that the ex-
pected male match surplus is finite for every contact (xm , xf ). Because
match surplus is shared in fixed proportions then, when a < 1, (11) also
ensures that female values exist.9
Although concavity ensures thatUðÞ is piecewise differentiable inU f, for
ease of exposition we assume that it is continuously differentiable. In that
case (10) implies that female marital payoff ~U f 5 ~U f ðxm , xf , v, V m , V f Þ is
given by the first-order condition
aU0ð ~U f jÞ½ ~U f 2 V f  1 1 2 að Þ½Uð ~U f jÞ 2 V m 5 0 (12)
when ~U f ≥ V f (otherwise there is no gain to trade and thematchdissolves).
Given ~U f , the male negotiates marital payoff ~U mðxm , xf , v, V m , V f Þ, where
~U m 5 Uð ~U f jxm , xf , vÞ: (13)
We use the same methodology as in the NTU case. The first step is to de-
scribe how marital payoffs ( ~U m , ~U f ) vary with values (Vm, V f ).
Lemma 4. Should a gain to trade exist, that is, ~U m > V m , then
i. 0 ≤ ∂ ~U m=∂V m ≤ 1: the male partner negotiates a higher marital
payoff should his threat point increase;
ii. ∂ ~U m=∂V f ≤ 0: the male partner negotiates a lower marital payoff
fshould his partner’s threat point V increase.
The equivalent statement applies for ~U f .8 The transferable utility case as defined in the stable matching literature presumes
Uðjxm , xf , vÞ is linear in U f; see, e.g., Chiappori and Weiss (2007) with marital public goods
(children).
9 When instead a 5 1, we must redefine the Pareto frontier as U f 5 UðU m jxm , xf , vÞ and
assume EvUðumðxmÞ=r jÞ exists. The following ignores this simple caveat.
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equilibrium search with multiple attributes 000Proof. The proof requires a trivial comparative static exercise on (12)
and (13), noting that Uð ~U f jxm, xf , vÞ is concave in ~U f . QED
We now determine equilibrium values (Vm, V f). Consider a single male
xm ∈ Qm with value Vm. If he contacts woman xf with equilibrium value
V f 5V f ðxf Þ, then, should a gain to trade exist, he negotiates marital pay-
off ~U mðxm , xf , v, V m, V f ðxf ÞÞ ≥ V m as determined by (12)–(13). Con-
versely, if there is no gain to trade, the two separate and continue search.
Standard arguments imply that Vm solves the Bellman equation:
rV m 5 um xmð Þ 1 l
ð
xf ∈Qf
Ev max ~U
mðxm, xf , v, V m, V f xf
 Þ
2Vm , 0gdGf xf
 
:
(14)
Expression (14) is an implicit function for V m 5 V mðxmÞ given the distri-
bution Gf of female singles and their values V f(), where equilibrium
V f ðxf Þ ≥ uf ðxf Þ=r for all xf ∈ Qf . The right-hand side of (14) is greater
than umðxmÞ ≥ 0, and lemma 4(i) implies that it is a continuous, decreasing
function of Vm. Now consider V m 5 umðxmÞ=r and note that lemma 4(ii)
and V f ðxf Þ ≥ uf ðxf Þ=r imply
E v max ~U
m xm , xf , v,
um xmð Þ
r , V
f xf
  
2
um xmð Þ
r , 0
 
≤ Ev max U
uf xf
 
r

 
,
um xmð Þ
r
 
2
um xmð Þ
r
and (11) ensures that this upper bound exists. Hence for V m ≥ umðxmÞ=r ,
the right-hand side of (14) is a finite, continuous, decreasing function
that is bounded below by umðxmÞ. It now follows that a solution to (14) ex-
ists, is unique, and implies V mðxmÞ ≥ umðxmÞ=r .
By symmetry, V f 5 V f ðxf Þ solves the Bellman equation
rV f 5 uf xf
 
1 l
ð
xm∈Qm
E v max ~U
f xm , xf , vjV m xmð Þ, V f
 
2V f , 0dGm xmð Þ:
(15)
Given distribution Gm of male single types and male values V m() satisfy-
ing V mðxmÞ ≥ umðxmÞ=r for all xm ∈ Qm , the same argument establishes
that a solution to (15) exists, is unique, and implies V f ðxf Þ ≥ uf ðxf Þ=r .
A matching equilibrium for the collective household case simply re-
quires that negotiated marital payoffs ( ~U m , ~U f ) and values (Vm, V f ) are
consistent.
Definition (Matching equilibrium for collective households). Equi-
librium is the set of functions f ~U m , ~U f , V m , V f g over ðxm , xf Þ ∈ ðQm  Qf Þ
and v ∈ Θ, which satisfy the functional equations (12)–(15).This content downloaded from 129.081.226.078 on January 05, 2019 09:37:58 AM
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AllBecause the same fixed-point argument as in Section II.A applies,
we sketch the relevant details. Let V mk ðxmÞ 5 V mðxmÞ for all xm ∈ Qm de-
scribe the equilibrium male values, where equilibrium implies V mk ðxmÞ ≥
umðxmÞ=r . With V m 5 V mk ðÞ, (10) and (15) jointly determine V f ðxf Þ for
each xf ∈ Qf , and the above has established that a solution for V f ðxf Þ ex-
ists, is unique, and implies V f ðxf Þ ≥ uf ðxf Þ=r . Let V fk denote this solution.
With V f 5 V fk ðÞ, (10) and (14) now determine V mðxmÞ for each xm ∈ Qm ,
and the above has established that a solution for V mðxmÞ exists, is unique,
and implies V mðxmÞ ≥ umðxmÞ=r . Let V mk11 denote these updated male val-
ues, and note we have established V mk11ðxmÞ ≥ umðxmÞ=r . A fixed point of
the functional equation V mk11 5 TV
m
k describes the matching equilibrium.
We again establish monotonicity. Consider male values V mk and V
m
k11
with the property that V mk ðxmÞ ≥ V mk11ðxmÞ ≥ umðxmÞ=r for all xm ∈ Qm . Con-
sider any female xf ∈ Qf , and note that lemma 4(ii) implies ∂ ~U f =∂V m ≤ 0;
that is, a female negotiates a lower payoff the greater the male threat
point. It is immediate that if all men have higher threat points V mk ≥
V mk11, the lower female marital payoff ~U
f in every match implies that her
V f must be lower; that is, V fk ðxf Þ ≤ V fk11ðxf Þ for all xf ∈ Qf . By symmetry,
it follows that if all women have lower threat points V fk ≤ V
f
k11, then each
male negotiates a higher payoff ~U m in any match. Thus TV mk ðxmÞ ≥
TV mk11ðxmÞ for all xm ∈ Qm andT is monotonic.
Finally, we identify an upper bound on male values: define V mðxmÞ as
the solution to (14) when V f ðxf Þ 5 uf ðxf Þ=r for all xf ∈ Qf , that is, when
women have minimal threat points. The above implies that a solution for
V m exists and is unique and V mðxmÞ ≥ uðxmÞ=r for all xm ∈ Qm.
Existence now follows by repeated iteration of the functional equation
V mk11 5 TV
m
k starting at V
m
0 5 V
m. Monotonicity and an induction argu-
ment imply a decreasing sequence of values V mk ðxmÞ for k 5 0, 1, 2, ::: ,
and, as every V mk ðxmÞ is bounded below by umðxmÞ=r , a limit point must ex-
ist. Because this set of limiting values is a fixed point of the functional
equation Vm 5 TV m , a matching equilibrium exists.
Multiple equilibria are again possible. One can instead begin the iter-
ation at minimal male values, that is, set V m0 ðxmÞ 5 uðxmÞ=r for each
xm ∈ Qm . Iteration of the functional equation then yields an increasing
sequence of values V mk ðxmÞ for k 5 0, 1, 2, ::: that are bounded above by
V mðxmÞ.C. Other Bargaining ProtocolsFollowing Binmore (1987), the bargaining literature has considered how
the assumptions of the dynamic bargaining game may, or may not, map
into a particular axiomaticNash bargaining solution. This literature raises
the issue of whether divorce is a credible threat should a partner fail a
household task. Analternative approach instead assumes that threat pointsThis content downloaded from 129.081.226.078 on January 05, 2019 09:37:58 AM
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equilibrium search with multiple attributes 000depend on inside options, that is, that neither partner might cooperate on
household tasks (Lundberg and Pollak 1993). If zNash describes household
actions taken in the event of noncooperation, one might instead adopt
the Nash bargaining solution
max
z∈Z
½U 1 zjð Þ 2 U 1ðzNashjÞa½U 2 zjð Þ 2 U 2ðzNashjÞ12a
to determine the terms of trade. The outside option principle then im-
plies that if V f > U 2ðzNashjÞ, so that divorce by the female partner is in-
deed credible, the relevant threat points revert to (V m, V f).
Regardless of the assumed bargaining protocol, however, what is cru-
cial for the existence of the matching equilibrium is the underlying pay-
off structure: is it the case that if all men have increased values Vm this
implies that all women have reduced values V f ? Oftentimes this will be
true, either because NTU implies that women receive fewer proposals or
because bargaining implies that women negotiate reduced marital pay-
offs. If so, the value mapT is then monotonic, and, along with bounded
payoffs, this not only is sufficient to imply existence of equilibrium but
also identifies a simple algorithm that computes it numerically.III. Application: The Impact of Equal Opportunities
for WomenTo focus on female outcomes, we keep the male side deliberately simple:
each male is characterized by a scalar, xm ; y, which describes his labor
market earnings. Earnings across single men have distribution Gm() and
support ½y, y . Each woman instead has two attributes (a, n), where “abil-
ity” a describes her earnings capabilities in the labor market while “charm”
n describes her innate charm to men, an asset that is assumed to be non-
productive in the labor market but valuable in the marriage market.
We extend the matching framework to include an ex ante investment
decision. Prior to entering the marriage market, we suppose that each
woman makes an education choice e ∈ f0, 1g, with e 5 1 indicating uni-
versity education and e 5 0 otherwise. The cost of university education
c > 0 is the same for all. We assume that a woman (n, a) earns w 5 a
when e 5 0 and w 5 ga when e 5 1, where g > 1 describes the wage re-
turn to education.
Given sunk education choice e, each woman (n, a) is described by her
ex post characteristics (n, w). We let Gf0 ðn, aÞ denote the exogenous dis-
tribution of underlying female attributes and Gf ðn, wÞ denote the post-
investment distribution of female characteristics.
We adopt the simpler NTU framework. Household consumption is a
joint public good and labor supply is jointly efficient with marital payoffs:This content downloaded from 129.081.226.078 on January 05, 2019 09:37:58 AM
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AllU m 5
b y 1 max w 2 f, 0½ ½  1 n
r ,
U f 5
b y 1 max w 2 f, 0½ ½ 
r ,
  (16)
where b and f are positive parameters. The term y 1 max½w 2 f, 0 de-
scribes joint labormarket earnings, where f denotes the opportunity cost
of child care; that is, the female partner continues in the labor market if
her earnings w ≥ f. Thus married women with w < f become homemak-
ers and do not participate in the labor market.10 Joint earnings are de-
flated by b ∈ ð0, 1, a parameter we discuss in greater detail in the conclu-
sion. The male flow payoff to a match thus depends on (deflated) joint
earnings b½y 1 max½w 2 f, 0 andpartner charmn.We refer to zðn, wÞ 5
bmax½w 2 f, 0 1 n as female “fitness” and note that male payoffs take
the form Um(y, z). The female match payoff U f depends on deflated joint
earnings but does not depend directly on her own charm. That is not to
say that charm has no value to her, for it directly affects male proposals
when single. We assumeflow payoffs umðyÞ 5 y, uf ðn, wÞ 5 w while single;
that is, flow utility equals flow income.
An investment equilibrium requires female education choice to be pri-
vately optimal. Unfortunately, the investment problem is not necessarily
well behaved because education increases fitness z 5 zðn, wÞ, which, in
turn, affects male proposal propensities. The following numerical exam-
ple identifies an investment equilibrium in which, for every charm n,
there exists an ability threshold an such that women (a, n) invest if and
only if ability a ≥ an. The assumed thresholds {an} determine the ex post
type distributions fGm ,Gf ðn, wÞjang, and the matching equilibrium then
determines values fV m , V f jang. Identifying an investment equilibrium
requires solving numerically for {an} such that V f ðn, ganÞ 2 V f ðn, anÞ 5 c
for all n. Because the return to education is not necessarily increasing
with ability, we have to verify numerically that women a > an do indeed
prefer e 5 1, while women a < an prefer e 5 0.A. Numerical ExampleTable 1 describes the functional forms and parameter values used (see
the appendix for motivation). This numerical example presumes just two
levels of female charm: that type i 5 H women have charm nH 5n=2
and type i 5 L women have nL 5 2n=2. Figure 3 graphs (annuitized) fe-
male values10 An alternative specification assumes that the lower earner assumes child care respon-
sibilities (e.g., Coles and Francesconi 2011).
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equilibrium search with multiple attributes 000vi að Þ ; r max V f ni , að Þ, V f ni, gað Þ 2 c½ 
by ability a and charm type i 5 L,H in an investment equilibrium.
The stablematching literature with transferable utility would imply that
each woman extracts 100 percent of the value of her charm n to men (for
menbid competitively for partners). But in a search framework withNTU,
amore charming woman can extract value only by being suitably selective
over male partners. Figure 3 demonstrates that the female return to
charm vH ðaÞ 2 vLðaÞ falls steeply with ability. For example, single women
a obtain a female return to charm of 88 percent, that is, vH ðaÞ 2 vLðaÞ 5
0:88n, while the highest-ability types have a return equal to just 15 percent.
This occurs because high-earning single women are already highly selec-
tive in the singles market and, for them with NTU, added female charm
(which further increases male proposal rates) provides relatively little
added value. The converse is the case for low-ability women on low earn-All useTABLE 1
Baseline Parameters and Functional Forms
Parameter Value
A.
r .04 (per year)
f $10,732 (per year)a
Gm(y) Truncated lognormal, with mm 5 $10:440 and
jm 5 $0:687b
½y, y [9,608, 157,192] ($ per year)b
G f ðajnÞ Gm() rescaled by g
G f ðnjaÞ Symmetric binomial, with draws from f2n=2, n=2g
H() H is normally distributed with mean5 F and SD 5 j
c $57,069 (over 4 years)c
B.
l 7.86d
b .51
F $31,000d
j $8,300d
n $51,800 (per year)
g 1.047This content dow
 subject to University of Note.—The parameter values shown in panel B are obtained by calibra-
tion. See Coles and Francesconi (2017).
a Source: Macartney and Laughlin (2011).
b Values are from the 2000 US census.
c The values are computed using information on average annual cost for
undergraduate tuition and fees in public institutions from the National Cen-
ter for Education Statistics, US Department of Education, Digest of Education
Statistics: 2013 (http://inces.ed.gov); information on the Federal Minimum
Wage in 2000 is from the US Department of Labor, History of Federal Min-
imum Wage Rates under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 1938–2009 (http://
www.dol.gov/whd/minwage/chart.htm); and information on earnings of fe-
male high school graduates us from the 2000 US census.
d Estimates are yearly values.nloaded from 129.081.226.078 on January 05, 2019 09:37:58 AM
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l
-ings: for them added charm is muchmore valuable in trying to attract de-
sirable male partners.
The investment equilibrium finds that type L women have the greater
incentive to invest in education (for them education has the larger im-
pact on male proposal propensities). The vertical lines in figure 3 de-
scribe the ability thresholds aL, aH, where women with ability to the right
of these thresholds invest in education.B. The Impact of Equal OpportunitiesTo illustrate the impact of equal opportunities on female outcomes and
values, we adopt a polar view of the “marriage bar”: that is, prior to the
1964 Civil Rights Act, mothers could earn only low wages y in the labor
market. Because the numerical example specifies child care costs f > y,
marital preferences (16) imply that married women leave the labor mar-
ket to raise the family and payoffs simplify to
U m 5
by 1 n
r and U
f 5
by
r : (17)
The marriage bar not only severely reduces the labor market participa-
tion rates of mothers but also yields very different matching incentives:FIG. 3.—Equilibrium values by charm type, with unequal and equal opportunities. Al
dashed figures refer to type L women, while all continuous figures refer to type H women
The two horizontal lines refer to the equilibrium flow values without equal opportunities
by charm type. The two upward-sloping curves refer to the equilibrium flow values with equa
opportunities, that is, vLðaÞ and vHðaÞ. The two vertical lines identify the investment thresh
olds by charm type, that is, aL and aH. Color version available as an online enhancement.edu/t-and-c).
equilibrium search with multiple attributes 000payoffs (17) imply that single males value potential partners solely by
charm. Assuming for simplicity that single women also earn only low
wages y, an investment equilibrium then finds that women do not invest
in a college education. Solving numerically for a matching equilibrium is
straightforward and yields annuitized values v H, vL, which are independent
of ability and correspond to the horizontal lines as drawn in figure 3.
Not surprisingly, high-ability women aremuch better off with equal op-
portunities. But lower-ability women are worse off: equal opportunities
in the labor market for them yield little added value while equilibrium
in the marriage market moves against them: the increase in fitness across
higher-ability women makes men more selective. Equal opportunities
also have a large, differential impact on the female return to charm: with
equal opportunities charm becomes more valuable to low-ability women
and less valuable to high-ability women, where unequal opportunities in-
stead yield a return of 76 percent.IV. ConclusionThis paper has developed an equilibrium marriage model of two-sided
search in which ex ante heterogeneous individuals have general payoff
functions with vectors of attributes. The approach is powerful for it iden-
tifies a simple algorithm that, in the numerical application, is found to
rapidly converge to equilibrium. The numerical example extends the
framework to include an endogenous investment margin and is used to
demonstrate how the arrival of equal opportunities had far-reaching con-
sequences for women, in both the labor andmarriagemarkets. Given the
straightforward extension to the collective household case, many future
extensions and applications are possible.
An important insight for future research is the central role played by
parameter b (in the numerical example) in explaining female hazard
rates into partnership formation. To understand its role, note for a mar-
ried couple with two children that the 2008 OECD income equivalence
scale is 2.1. Thus given family joint earnings w 1 y, the OECD equivalent
scale implies that individual consumption within the family is deflated to
bðw 1 yÞ, where b 5 0:48 (where 0:48 5 1=2:1).11 Consider then a sin-
gle woman with wage w > f who receives a proposal. The search frame-
work implies that she compares (i) the value of continued search, which
depends on her flow consumption w while single plus the option value
of seeking a preferred partner, to (ii) being married and here raising a
family with two children, which yields deflated flow utility bw plus added
flow utility bðy 2 fÞ 1 v f proffered by the male proposer.11 Guvenen and Rendall (2015) use income equivalence scales tomodel the costs of divorce
and show how female college education may provide insurance against future divorce risk.
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AllAn obvious case is b 5 1, which implies thatmarrying an equal-earning
partner doubles consumption, net of fixed cost bf. But because equilib-
rium sorting generates positive assortive matching, b 5 1 is problematic
for it implies that high-earning women then have a keener incentive
to match more quickly. In essence 1 2 b describes a “family tax” on own
earnings, where a large value of 1 2 b is central to explaining why high-
earning single women match relatively slowly (Coles and Francesconi
2017). Greater charm, interestingly, has the opposite effect. When amore
charming female can monetize the value of her charm only by partner-
ship, she has a greater incentive to match more quickly. By changing the
relative values of female ability and charm, the arrival of equal opportuni-
ties and the family tax fundamentally affect the timing of partnership, the
degree of positive assortative matching across partners, and family earn-
ings inequality.
Although the focus of the paper has been on the marriage market, it
also applies to equilibrium matching in the labor market with wage bar-
gaining. Of course, steady-state equilibrium in a labor market framework
requires solving for not only the matching equilibrium, as done here,
but also the steady-state distribution of types that depends on the inflows
and outflows of trading agents. This generates additional sorting exter-
nalities, for agent entry and match strategies then affect the steady-state
composition of singles, and feedback effects may generate multiple equi-
libria (Burdett and Coles 1999). In numerical work, updating the type
distribution by solving standard steady-state flow conditions is not a dif-
ficult computational problem (Greenwood et al. [2016], among others).
Such composition effects also arise in a marriage market context when
fertility is an endogenous choice. For example, Baudin, de la Croix,
and Gobbi (2015) find that more educated women are more likely to re-
main childless.Appendix
A. Data Sources
Our data sources, which we use for the discussion in the introduction and the
numerical exercise in Section III, come from the Integrated Public Use Micro-
data Series (IPUMS) of the decennial censuses (Ruggles et al. 2010).
We use decennial censuses from 1850 to 2000 (1890 is missing) and the 2009
American Community Survey (ACS) sample, which is a 1 percent national ran-
dom sample of the population. Detailed information on education, which is
grouped in 12 different categories in the variable EDUC, is not available before
the 1940 census. Data on labor force participation come from the variable
LABFORCE and cover all census years with the exception of 1850, in which the
information for women is not recorded. For our analysis we select only women
who are aged between 25 and 34 for the education and labor market statistics.This content downloaded from 129.081.226.078 on January 05, 2019 09:37:58 AM
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equilibrium search with multiple attributes 000The sample size therefore varies across censuses and outcomes. Sample sizes for
figures 1 and 2 therefore vary from about 20,000 women in 1860 to about 1million
in 2000.
Figure 1 shows the trends in the proportion of women aged 25–34 who are in
paid employment, expressed in percentage terms. Unemployed women and
women who are out of the labor force in that age range are in the base category.
Besides all women, the figure also shows the trends for mothers and for women
who are single and never married.12 Figure 2 shows the proportion of women
aged 25–34 who have a university degree or higher qualification.
Finally, data on male earnings come from the 2000 census and are computed
using the variable INCWAGE. The statistics reported in the text (table 1) are cal-
culated on all males born between 1951 and 1960 (hence aged 40–49 in 2000)
after dropping the top and bottom 1 percent of the distribution of INCWAGE
out of the analysis.
B. A Note on the Parametric Assumptions Used in the Application
The parameters reported in the top panel of table 1 are chosen as follows. All
women are assumed to have a standard annual discount rate of r 5 4 percent.
Child care costs, f, are set at $10,732 per year for two children. This figure comes
from the estimate of child care expenditures of 19.9 percent of female yearly per-
sonal income per child by Macartney and Laughlin (2011, table 2). With an av-
erage personal labor income of $26,964 from the 2000 census ($21,750 for the
75 percent low-education women and $41,350 for the 25 percent college-educated
women), this estimate leads to annual child care costs of $5,366 per child (or
$10,732 for two children, as assumed in the model).
The distribution ofmale earningsGm(y) is (truncated) lognormal. The 2000 cen-
sus data on male earnings yield a mean of 10.44 and a standard deviation of 0.687.
We truncate at two standard deviations from the mean, so that y 5$9,608 and
y 5 $157,192 per year, and renormalize the probability weights accordingly. The
distributionGf (a) is also a truncated lognormal distribution, where we assume that
women have the same distribution of abilities as men, but deflated by parameter
g > 1. Thus if all women invest in education, equal opportunities imply that women
enjoy the same distribution of wages.
The cost of education, c, is computed as follows. The source is the National Cen-
ter for Education Statistics, US Department of Education (http://inces.ed.gov),
Digest of Education Statistics: 2013. According to this source, the average annual cost
for undergraduate tuition and fees in public institutions offering a 4-year degree
calculated between 2000 and 2003 is $3,967.25 in current dollars (with values
ranging from $3,501 to $4,587). The corresponding total over the 4-year period
is $15,869. (The same annual statistic including room and board is $9,575 for a
total over the 4-year period of $38,300.) Our measure of opportunity cost is based
on the Federal Minimum Wage in 2000 of $5.15 per hour (source: US Depart-
ment of Labor, History of Federal Minimum Wage Rates under the Fair Labor12 Because data onmarital status are available only since the 1880 census and not before,
the employment series for single, never-married women can be constructed only from that
year onward.
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suming 2,000 hours per year for a full-time worker (40 weekly hours over 50 weeks
in a year), total annual earning will be $10,300, which over 4 years becomes
$41,200. Summing up this and the direct cost of education leads to a total of
$57,069 over 4 years. An alternative measure of the opportunity cost is given by
the observed average earnings for women of all races, who are high school grad-
uates (including GED) and are aged 18–21. This figure is $9,042 (standard devi-
ation5 $11,076) from the 2000 US census. Over the 4-year period, this translates
to $36,168, which summed up to the direct cost of education becomes $52,037.
We have performed the analysis using this new estimate, but all our results remain
unchanged. Finally, we have also performed the analysis using the figure for the
cost of education that includes room and board. This is $79,500 over the 4-year
period. Again, all the results of the paper are qualitatively unchanged.
The distribution of female charm is assumed to be orthogonal to the distribu-
tion of female abilities. Although Hamermesh and Biddle (1994) find evidence
of a positive impact of workers’ physical looks on their earnings, we simplify by
abstracting from this effect. As there is no objective information on the distribu-
tion of charm n in the population (Buss 2003), we suppose there are just two lev-
els n ∈ f2n=2, n=2g, which is symmetrically distributed, and so n also describes
the standard deviation of charm across single women.
The distribution of idiosyncratic (match-specific) draws,H(), is assumed to be
N(F, j2), where F describes the expected net increase in flow utility through start-
ing a family.
Coles and Francesconi (2017) identify the remaining parameter values by cal-
ibrating the model to the correlation of partner incomes prior to match forma-
tion, female education rates, and on empirical hazard functions, which describe
the rate at which women enter first partnership by education choice and age. Be-
cause the family tax 1 2 b is large, the imputed return to raising a family, F 5
$31,000 per year, is large to compensate. The estimated return to education,
g5 4.7 percent, yields the target female education rate of 25.5 percent. This lat-
ter estimate is very close to the average returns to education found in all the twins
studies reviewed by Card (1999). Notice that it is also in line with the estimates
reported in discrete choice dynamic programming models, such as Eckstein and
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